Happiness - Some thoughts

Before I even get going:
a) It is often not even clear what exactly is being discussed when people talk about happiness In this case, I am really talking about long-term happiness when asked to view one's current life-situation as a whole.
b) I have found sources that ask people about their happiness do not seem to come up with the same results, e.g. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/11362246/Just-three-in-10-people-feel-happy-with-their-lives.html versus https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/15/british-people-nearly-twice-happy-think/

I should really do more research on all this if I get time, but anyway...

I am not sure that maximising average happiness is a very good aim, for various reasons:

1) Cultural and social factors are pretty big in all this. For example...
  • As far as I can seen, there is a strong tendency for French people to consistently express themselves less satisfied while appearing to demonstrate the same level of satisfaction (as compared to other continental European nationalities). In something of a contrast, London's inhabitants love to go on about how great London is, even though they generally spend their lives looking miserable.
  • In many circumstances, it is socially unacceptable to say you are unhappy, as in a happiness-seeking society, it carries the shame of failure. This can be expected to affect both conversations on happiness and face-to-face surveys, and would perhaps then carry across into the way written surveys are answered.
  • However, the context of the question makes a difference. I reckon (and must try it out as an experiment) that many inhabitants of London are much more likely to claim happiness if the preceding conversation was rigged with politically loaded terms like "multiculturalism" and "cosmopolitan", since they attach a political obligation to be happy. Alternatively, throwing "Brexit", "discrimination", or "white privilege" into the preceding conversation will attach a political obligation to be sad. 
  • This links not only to my hypotheses regarding the politicisation of the question of happiness (which I will develop in one of my comments below) but also to a more general social hypothesis of mine. This hypothesis is that in London, and comparable dense cities, people are generally less genuine, and generally speaking, will therefore use contextual social cues to ascertain the (socially) "correct" answer to more or less any question, rather than trying to think of the genuine answer.

2) Assuming I can define and measure it in a meaningful way, I would argue that minimising the size of an unhappiness category is a more proper aim than aiming for highest mean happiness (this is a "negative utilitarian" viewpoint). Moving someone from 7/10 happiness to 9/10 happiness seems to me to be of little importance compared to moving someone from the terrible misery of 1/10 to the less terrible misery of 3/10.

3) At times, unhappiness and suffering can be positive for the individual and others. A human cocooned away from difficulties, suffering and unhappiness would presumably be an inadequate and unhealthy human being. (Humans very often choose to suffer in the hope of many different types of future gain.) Even aiming to minimise suffering is therefore inadequate. There is a need to divide suffering into "constructive suffering" which ends in a human built into something more and better, and life-destroying "destructive suffering".

4) Again assuming I can define and measure it in a meaningful way, I am not convinced that maximising happiness is even a sound goal, at least if I assume (as I do) morality based on altruism. The general consensus appears to be that one end of the scale is fundamentally bad and the other fundamentally good. I personally feel that both ends are fundamentally bad, and the centre fundamentally good. If you are really very happy, you either have not understood the misery in the world you live in, or you are indifferent to it to an extent which makes me concerned that you are happy. If you are truly very happy, you have, so to speak, a surplus to sacrifice. If you are very happy with your life, in the long run, you are in a position to start making some sacrifices for others who are at the other end of the scale. Until you have made enough sacrifices to no longer be at the very happy end, perhaps you are not really playing your proper part.

5) The ONS now compiles happiness data. As far as the measurement of happiness is concerned, it might perhaps turn out to be a misleading statistic if voters take it as an indication of how good a government is.

Firstly, the mere fact that policies you perceive as good are put in place (or conversely those you see as bad are put in place) may influence perception of happiness in a misleading way. Future speculation is not unrelated of course, to past experience, but it can mislead nonetheless, especially where any level of ideology is involved. For example, I think Trump will be great and make my country and life great again, so I feel happy not on the basis of what he has actually changed in my life, but merely on my unfulfilled estimate of it. Or alternatively, I think Trump is obviously fascism resurgent in camouflage, leading America and civilisation to doom, so I feel unhappy not on the basis of what he has actually changed in my life, but merely on my unfulfilled estimate of it. In this sense, happiness can be influenced (to some extent as yet unknown) by politics not in measuring real political effects, but in measuring speculated future political effects - i.e. it is much the same as voting.

Secondly, if happiness levels are increasingly seen to validate a government, then at some point, people will realise that by saying they are happy, they can validate a government they support, and that by saying they are unhappy, they can invalidate a government they dislike. This need not at all be disingenuous. As more happiness levels become a government measure, the more likely a question about happiness will bring politics to mind, and the more the effect I discussed in the last paragraph can be expected. However in so far as it can be disingenuous, this tendency will favour the political viewpoints whose supporters are most disingenuous.

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